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SKEPTICISM AND THE SKEPTICAL THEIST 
John Beaudoin 
According to skeptical theists, our failure to find morally justifying goods for 
certain of the world's evils fails to constitute even prima facie evidence that 
these evils are genuinely gratuitous. For even if such reasons did exist, it is 
not to be expected that our limited intellects would discover them. In this arti-
cle I consider whether their skepticism about our ability to discover morally 
justifying goods for various evils commits skeptical theists to more radical 
fOnTIS of skepticism. 
I. 
Skeptical theists maintain the following thesis about human cognitive 
access to possible moral goods (the formulation is Michael Bergmann's): 
STl: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we 
know of are representative of the possible goods there are.' 
We can think of possible goods as possible states of affairs that have 
positive moral value: states of affairs such as that in which human beings 
cultivate loving relationships with one another, gain deeper understanding 
of nature, or freely engage in acts of charity. Possible goods we know of are 
possible goods that we find to obtain in this world, or that, at least, we can 
imagine obtaining. The eradication of smallpox is a possible good in this 
sense. So also is the condition in which human beings enjoy the beatific 
vision in Heaven, since we can imagine the obtaining of such a good. 
According to STl, it is a live possibility that the possible goods humans 
know about are only a small, unrepresentative sample of all the possible 
goods there are. To say that this is a live possibility is to say that it is true 
for all we know: for all we know, we are poorly epistemically situated vis-
a-vis the full range of possible goods. Put differently, we are in no good 
position to know what is the objective probability that the possible goods 
we know of are representative of the full range of possible goods.2 
An evil is inscrutable if, even after thinking hard about it, we know of no 
possible good which is such that obtaining that good, or making it possible 
that it obtain, morally justifies God in permitting the evil. Put differently, 
an evil is inscrutable if we know of no morally sufficient reason (MSR) for 
God's permitting it. If in fact there is 110 MSR for an evil, known or not, 
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then the evil is gratuitous. The suffering of children with cancer is an 
inscrutable evil if we cannot imagine anything that would justify God's 
permitting it; if in fact nothing could justify his permitting it, then this evil is 
gratuitous. Theists are committed to believing that no actual evil is gratu-
itous in this sense.' 
The following question has received considerable attention: is the 
inscrutability of an evil a good reason to believe in its gratuitousness? That is, is 
our failure to find any MSR for an evil good reason to believe that there in 
fact is no reason that could justify God's permitting it? William Rowe has 
argued that it is." Let us refer to any such inference - from the inscrutability 
of an evil to its gratuitousness - a Rowean inference. One of Rowe's exam-
ples involves a fawn that dies slowly and painfully from bums incurred in 
a forest fire ignited by lightning; call this evil E. The inference is: 
P: No good we know of justifies God in permitting E. 
Q: SO no good at all justifies God in permitting E. 
And since God cannot co-exist with gratuitous evil, the inscrutability of 
E is prima facie evidence of God's non-existence. 
STl is supposed to block Rowean inferences like the one above by pro-
viding the Rowean with an undermining defeater for his belief in E's gra-
tuitousness: the truth of STl would make P poor inductive support for Q. 
The good that justifies God's permitting the fawn's suffering might simply 
be beyond our ken, and so one calmot rationally accept ST1 and continue 
to hold Q on the basis of P. In this way, the Rowean argument from evil is 
defeated. 
What some critics allege is that there is for skeptical theists a serious 
downside to deploying STl against Rowe's evidential argument. The 
claim, roughly, is that they thereby commit themselves to other, worse 
forms of skepticism, such as skepticism about the past, about morality, 
about certain theolOgical propositions, or about the reliability of their own 
belief-forming mechanisms. After all, God might have some morally good 
but inscrutable reason for actualizing any of various scenarios described by 
skeptics. For all we know, by the skeptical theist's lights, God has some 
good but inscrutable reason for engaging in massive deceptions on a level 
with those perpetrated by Descartes's evil genius. I'll call this the Pandora's 
Box (PB) objection to skeptical theism. My aim below will be to explicate 
the various forms PB can take, and to consider whether any plausible 
rejoinders are available to skeptical theists. 
II. 
Below is one formulation of PB. Let s be the state of affairs in which 
God created an old-looking universe five minutes ago. Skeptical theists 
allegedly are committed to all of the following: 
(1) God exists. 
(2) God has the power to actualize s. 
(3) For all we know, there is an MSR for God's actualizing s. 
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From these it is supposed to follow that: 
(4) For all we know, God actualizes s; for all we know the uni-
verse is only five minutes old. 
Thus, for example, Bruce Russell: 
Is the view that there is a God who, for reasons beyond our ken, 
allows the suffering which appears pointless to us any different epis-
temically from the view that there is a God who created the universe 
[5 minutes] ago and, for reasons beyond our ken, has deceived us 
into thinking it is older? It does not seem to be. .... [I]f it is not rea-
sonable to believe that God deceived us, for some reason beyond our 
ken, when he created the universe, it is not reasonable to believe that 
there is some reason beyond our ken wruch, if God exists, would jus-
tify him in allowing all the suffering we see.5 
Russell's phraSing is apt to mislead. It prompts Bergmann to give the 
following characterization of PB: 
The persuasive force of [PB] depends entirely on the false assumption 
that it is excessively skeptical to have any serious doubts about whether 
the goods we know of are representative of the goods there are. 
Those proposing [PB] appeal to our reasonable disapproval of exces-
sive skepticism and then try to get us to disapprove of STI on the 
grounds that it involves excessive skepticism. But having doubts 
about the representativeness of the goods we know of is not exces-
sively skeptical. The possibility that the goods we know of aren't 
representative of the goods there are is a live possibility, one that we 
are sensible to consider and take seriously. It is not remote and far-
fetched in the way the Cartesian demon and the [5-minute]-0Id earth 
possibilities are." 
Let us be clear that it is not, or at least it need not, be any part of PB to 
claim that skepticism about our access to possible goods is on a par with -
as 'excessive' as - skepticism about the past or about the reality of the exter-
nal world.7 Rather, the claim is that anyone who believes in a being who 
has the power - and, for all we know, a morally sufficient reason - to 
engage in large-scale deceptions should consider it a live possibility that 
for some good but inscrutable reason this being is engaged in such a decep-
tion. If we are obligated to suspend judgment about whether there are 
God-justifying reasons for all of the inscrutable evils we observe, then we 
ought to suspend judgment as well on whether God actualizes s. 
Bergmann is correct, nevertheless, when he claims that PB is a weak objec-
tion, at least as it stands. The problem with it is tills: it presupposes that the 
basis on which any skeptical theist believes that God does not actualize s is a 
Rowean inference, from 'I can't see what would justify God's actualizing 5' to 
'probably there is no reason - probably God does not actualize 5.' This basis 
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for believing that s does not obtain is unavailable to the skeptical theist; that 
much is correct. But the point is that other, Rowean-inference-independent 
(hereafter, 'RI-independent') reasons - perhaps the same ones atheists or non-
skeptical theists have for believing in an old universe (whatever such reasons 
might be) - might still be available to the skeptical theist. In other words, in 
order that skeptical theists be committed to skepticism about the past, the fol-
lowing must be true: the only, or the principle basis they have for believing 
that God does not actualize s is their failure to imagine any good reason that 
would justify God's engaging in such a large-scale deception. Whether this is 
true - whether skeptical theists are without any RI-independent reasons for 
disbelieving in s - is not to the point here: the point is that a commitment to 
STI does not by itself entail any commitment to skepticism about s. 
Consider an analogy. Suppose I know nothing about Smith's honesty, or 
lack thereof. For all I know, Smith is an inveterate liar. Now I claim to 
believe something (P) Smith told me, but not on the basis of Smith's telling 
me; instead, I've confirmed with my own eyes that P. Clearly in this case it 
wouldn't do for someone to challenge the rationality of my belief by point-
ing out that for all I know Smith is a liar; my belief that P isn't based on 
Smith's testimony. 
In the same way, if a skeptical theist's only basis for believing in an old 
universe is his belief in God's omnibenevolence (more specifically, in 
God's unwillingness to engage in deceptions except when there is good 
reason to do so), then he has a problem, since by his own lights God's 
moral perfection is no guarantee against his permitting all sorts of 
inscrutable evils. But, in principle at least, the skeptical theist might have 
good independent reasons for believing in an old universe - some reason 
not having to do with God's moral character. Perhaps there is some theo-
logically neutral, telling philosophical argument for rejecting skepticism 
about the past. If there is, then on this basis the skeptical theist can con-
clude that God has no MSR for actualizing s, since he has not actualized it. 
But this knowledge won't have been arrived at by any Rowean inference. 
So much for the initial formulation of PB. Formulations that substitute for 
s skeptical scenarios involving (say) other minds or the external world can be 
dealt with in similar fashion. This holds true even if the skeptical scenario 
involves God's endowing us with a set of belief-forming mechanisms all of 
which are unreliable. Any reasons available to non-theists for trusting in the 
reliability of our belief-fonning mechanisms are ones of which skeptical the-
ists can avail themselves, subject only to the following restriction: they must 
be compatible with the latter's theological commitments and with any 
account they provide about the possible causes of our (possibly) limited 
moral visionY The suggestion, for example, that our cognitive deficiency in 
this area is only one symptom of a more general cognitive defect that afflicts 
post-Fall humanity runs the risk of w1dermining any attempt to marshal RI-
independent grounds for rejecting the more radical forms of skepticism.9 
III. 
Consider now a formulation of PB aimed at showing that at least skepti-
cal theists cannot avoid an unpalatable theological skepticism. The skeptical 
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theist allegedly is committed to all of the following, where r is the state of 
affairs in which God provides us, through some mode of special revelation, 
with false information about his eschatological plans for humanity: 
(1) God exists. 
(2) God has the power to actualize r. 
(3) For all we know, there is an MSR for God's actualizing r. 
(4) We have no good Rl-independent reasons for believing that 
God does not actualize r. 
(5) So for all we know God actualizes r; for all we know God's 
revelation is false and (hence) so are our beliefs about his 
eschatological plans for humanity. 
I rejected the previous versions of PB for the reason that skeptical theists 
might have independent grounds on which to hold the target beliefs, such 
as the belief in the reality of the external world; they need not arrive at 
them by performing any Rowean inference - what STl prohibits. The pro-
ponent of PB, however, might suggest that at least in the present case no 
such independent grounds are available: we only have God's revelation as a 
source of information about his eschatological plans, and the reliability of 
this source is what the present version of PB puts in doubt.1O 
Return again to the case of Smith. Smith testifies to me that P, and now I 
accept P on the basis of Smith's testimony; unlike in the previous case, I 
don't have the testimony of my own eyes to the truth of what Smith told 
me, or any other independent grounds for accepting P. If I now come to 
believe that, for all I know, Smith is a liar, or at least that in these matters 
he lies as often as he tells the truth, then I have an undermining defeater 
for my belief that P. Allegedly, skeptical theists are in roughly the same 
position in respect to their beliefs about God's plans, such as their belief 
that some souls will be saved: God, for all we know, has some good but 
inscrutable reason for deceiving us in such matters, and we have nothing 
to go on here but God's own word. 
Clearly the upshot of PB is that it would be irrational for skeptical theists 
to hold the target beliefs about God's eschatological plans on the basis of 
his revelation, in the same way that the Rowean would be irrational to 
hold Q on the basis of P, if he also accepts STl. The implicit epistemic prin-
ciple at work here appears to be roughly the following: 
D: Suppose P's belief B is based on R.11 Now consider some proposi-
tion S which is such that if S is true, then R is no good basis on which 
to believe B. If P believes that S is true for all P knows, then P cannot 
rationally continue to hold B on the basis of R. 
Confronted with the present version of PB it would be tempting, per-
haps, for the skeptical theist to reject principle D and to replace it with 
some principle about defeaters that enables him to avoid the charge of irra-
tionality.12 But going this route involves some risk. Suppose, for example, 
that 0 is replaced with the following principle: 
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D': Suppose P's belief B is based on R. Now consider some proposi-
tion S which is such that if S is true, then R is no good basis on which 
to believe B. If P believes that probably S is true, then P cannot ratio-
nally continue to hold B on the basis of R. 
According to D' the inscrutable probability of S would be insufficient to 
make it a successful undermining defeater: it must be that P believes S 
probably is true - more likely true than not. That would avoid the problem 
raised by the present version of PB since, plausibly enough, it was not 
claimed that probably God has a good reason for providing us with a false 
revelation. But it comes at the cost of rendering ST1 innocuous against the 
Rowean argument from evil, since STl does not allege that probably the 
possible goods we know of are unrepresentative of the total range of possi-
ble goods there are; STl only states (to paraphrase) that for all we know they 
are unrepresentativeY Skeptical theists who want to retain the ability to 
block Rowe's crucial inference cannot avoid PB by using D'. 
Similarly risky would be the suggestion that r represents a state of 
affairs so intrinsically evil that no omnibenevolent being, in any recogniz-
able sense of the term benevolent, could permit its actualization, and that on 
this basis skeptical theists can avoid PB by rejecting (3t above. The claim, 
based perhaps on a moral intuition, would be that there could not be an 
MSR for God's actualizing f. The problem is that there's not much to rec-
ommend the view that f is a worse state of affairs than any of the evils we 
observe in this world, the permission of which is, according to theists, com-
patible with God's impeccable moral character. At the very least, the skep-
tical theist who goes this route must concede that our intuitions about 
what is morally justifiable sub specie crternitatis are, at least in some extreme 
cases, reliable. And this opens the door again to evidential arguments 
from evil that proceed from actual evils comparable to or (I would esti-
mate) far worse than r. 
What other recourse is there for skeptical theists, if any? 1 outline two 
alternatives below. 
(1) Reject (4), above, by reasoning inductively from the truth of God's indepen-
dently checkable revelations. Some of what God tells us might be indepen-
dently verifiable, either by empirical scientists (e.g. archaeologists), or by 
philosophersY If in these revelations God has a track-record of honesty, 
then we might reason inductively to the truth of what he tells us regarding 
matters not independently checkable. It is, after all, commonplace to rea-
son thus in regard to other humans. 
But there are two major worries here. The first is that in order for this sug-
gestion to work, it must be practically feasible to check out God's other reve-
lations - if not all of them then at least a large enough number of them to 
establish a solid track record of honesty. The practical barriers to this are, 
however, considerable, beginning with the difficulties in determining 
whether a given revelation is one genuinely from God, and including also the 
problem of being able to interpret the revelations accurately and specifically 
enough that we know what would constitute confirming evidence for them. 
But perhaps the more compelling worry here is the traditional one 
about tying one's faith in God or his revelation to the results of empirical 
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investigations by historians and scientists: if a skeptical theist's confidence 
in the truth of God's uncheckable revelations must rise and fall with the 
vicissitudes of historical scholarship, for example, then he is likely to find 
himself always vacillating between belief and unbelief. 
(2) Give a circular justification for judging it improbable that God actualizes r. 
Assume that the proposition that God deceives us for some good reason is 
improbable relative to what we learn by divine revelation (imagine God 
begins every revelation with 'Truly I say unto you .... '). To claim on this 
basis that it is not true for all we know that God's revelation is false would 
of course involve us in circularity: using revelation's outputs to justify 
belief in its reliability. But as many are quick to point out, the same circu-
larity infects any attempt to show the reliability of more mundane belief-
sources such as sense-perception by using their outputs. If in the latter 
case the circularity involved is unobjectionable, then why not in the former 
case? Of course the analogy with sense perception is much too facile as it 
stands. The issue is whether revelation in its various modes constitutes 
what William Alston calls a doxastic practice roughly on a par with sense 
perception in its epistemic credentials - e.g. in the degree to which it is self-
supporting, and in the sophistication of its defeater system. 
Alternative (2) seems to me the only recourse for skeptical theists that 
holds out much hope of obviating the present form of PB. The literature on 
the topic - especially on Alston's recent work on it - is already considerable, 
however, and too complex to get into here. IS 
What can be said is that, absent a compelling argument for the unlikeli-
hood of anyone's making good on the suggested analogy between special 
revelation and more mundane belief-sources, that theological skepticism is 
unavoidable by skeptical theists because RI-independent grounds for rational 
belief in God's revelation are unavailable, has not conclusively been shown.16 Of 
course, other means by which to link skeptical theism with a broad theolog-
ical skepticism might exist, but none, so far as I know, has been suggested. 
IV. 
I look now at two more forms that PB can take. According to the first, 
STl prohibits skeptical theists from using inverse-probability arguments in 
natural theology. According to the second, the moral skepticism explicit in 
STl and in other skeptical theses to be listed below is, from the standpoint 
of moral praxis, crippling or at least degrading. I'll have comparatively 
more to say about the second challenge. 
The central idea behind the use of inverse-probability in natural theolo-
gy is that God's existence probabilifies, to varying degrees (which might be 
expressed only comparatively), certain of the empirical observations we 
make. In some cases it is claimed that if God exists then the observed phe-
nomena are rather to be expected, and that this is so because of what we 
know about God's nature - in particular, that he is omnibenevolent - and 
about value. Here is an example from Richard Swinburne: 
Does a God have reason for making a world in which men have 
responsibility for the well-being of each other? Fairly evidently, to 
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some extent yes. A world in which good things can only be attained 
by co-operation is one which a God has reason to make - for benefit-
ing each other is a good thing ..... A good God, like a good father, will 
delegate responsibility. In order to allow creatures a share in creation, 
he will allow them the choice of hurting and maiming, of frustrating 
the divine plan. Our world is of course one where creatures have just 
such deep responsibility for each other.l7 
The crucial point is that this type of argument centrally involves making 
claims about what sorts of things we are likely to find in a world created and super-
intended by God. Swinburne expresses some diffidence about our ability to 
make such judgments, given our human limitations, but on the whole he 
finds no prohibitive implausibility in our doing SO.18 
But anyone who embraces STl will find it too implausible to claim that 
we know (on grounds independent of any revelation from the being whose 
existence is to be shown), even to a good approximation, what to expect to 
find in a world God creates.19 That's exactly why finding massive amounts 
of evil in the world does not, on the skeptic's view, tend to disconfirm 
God's existence. For all we know, the achieving of some great good 
requires that God permit so much evil. Similarly, for all we know, there is 
some great good the obtaining of which requires that God not create a 
world in which creatures are significantly responsible for one another's 
well-being. And so the assignments of conditional probability - even com-
parative ones - cannot be made here, and natural theological arguments by 
inverse-probability cannot get off the ground. 
This version of PB is, I believe, correct, so long as it isn't simply built 
into the theistic hypothesis that God wants to create a world with the fea-
tures we find this one to have. Swinburne, for methodological reasons20, 
makes conditional assignments of probability on the more austere hypoth-
esis that God exists - i.e. that there is a disembodied spirit who is 
omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, necessary, and perfectly 
good. Given only the austere hypothesis, and given the live possibility that 
God, for some inscrutable good reason, would refrain from creating a 
world with the features we find this one to have, the evidence in question 
has inscrutable probability on the hypothesis, and the inverse-probability 
arguments cannot be formulated. Whether this represents a serious prob-
lem for skeptical theists depends entirely on how much importance, if any, 
they assign to being able to prove God's existence, either at all or by this 
particular method, and opinions on these matters are likely to differ from 
one skeptical theist to another.21 
The final version of PB to be looked at here involves the claim that the 
moral skepticism explicit in STl and in several other skeptical theses listed 
below commits skeptical theists to a practically incapacitating skepticism 
about our ability to make moral judgments even in mundane contexts. The 
other skeptical theses are below (ST2 and ST3 are given by Bergmann): 
ST2: We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we 
know of are representative of the possible evils there are. 
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ST3: We have no good reason for tlunking that the entailment rela-
tions we know of between possible goods and the permission of pos-
sible evils are representative of the entailment relations there are 
between possible goods and the permission of possible evils. 
ST4: We have no good reason for tltinking that the total moral value 
or disvalue we perceive in certain complex states of affairs accurately 
reflects the total moral value or disvalue they really have. 
A particular skeptical theist might reject one or more of STl-4, but for sim-
plicity let's assume that skeptical theists embrace all four theses. ST2 is a nat-
ural corollary of STl, and it is equally relevant to countering inductive argu-
ments from evil, since the reason for which God prevents some inscrutable 
evil might be in order to avoid some worse evil that is beyond our ken. 
The idea behind ST3 is that there might be unsuspected connections -
physical, metaphysical, or logical - between certain goods and certain evils. 
Suppose that we know of a certain possible good G which is such that if the 
only way to get G were to permit some evil E, then G would justify God's 
permitting E. Suppose the problem (in respect to its usefulness to theodi-
cists) with G is that, to all appearances, E simply is not a necessary precon-
dition for obtaining tltis good; it seems to us that God could get G by other 
means much less costly in human suffering. What ST3 alleges is that 
humans really are in no good position to make the following inference: 
1. So far as we know E is not a necessary condition for God's 
bringing about G. 
2. So E is not a necessary condition for God's bringing about G. 
The skepticism at issue here is not specifically moral, but it is relevant in 
an obvious way to our ability to make claims about the existence of God-
justifying moral reasons for various evils. 
Daniel Howard-Snyder provides an expression of ST4: 
[W]hy can a child discern the literary merits of a comic book but not 
Henry V? .... Why can a child recognize the value of his friendship 
with his buddy next door but not the full value of his parents' love 
for each other? Surely because Henry V .... and adult love involve 
much more than he is able to comprehend. And tltis is true of adults 
as well, as reflection on our progress in understanding the complexi-
ty of various things of value reveals. For example, periodically 
reflecting on the fabric of our relationships .... we might well find 
strands and shades that when brought to full light permit us to see 
love as more valuable than we had once thought.22 
The idea here is not that our estimates of the total moral value in some 
state of affairs might be wrong because there are unknown goods or evils 
causally or logically connected with this one (STl & ST2), or known goods 
or evils connected with it in unknown ways (ST3). Rather, it is that we can 
be wrong, perhaps radically, about the intrinsic value of tltings apart from 
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their connections with other states of affairs. We might know, for example, 
that free will is good, but fail to realize just ]IOW good it is, in itself. So even 
if, for example, the value of our being free does not seem great enough to 
justify God in permitting moral evils like the Holocaust, that is no good 
reason to suppose it is not in fact good enough. 
As with SIl, my interest in ST2-4 is not in their truth or falsity, but in 
whether commitment to them really has the unpalatable consequences that 
critics have alleged (of course, if they do, then depending on what those 
consequences are, they might bear on the truth or falsity of the theses that 
entail them). Of the import skeptical theism has for our ability to make 
moral judgments even in the most quotidian contexts, Evan Fales says: 
In matters of morals, we seek to know what the total good and evil 
associated with contemplated states of affairs are, for it is this which 
determines whether those states are to be desired, and whether we 
should seek to bring them about. But if our knowledge of the moral 
value of these states of affairs is as radically defective as the [skepti-
cal] theist has to claim - states of affairs which are not only common 
but often within our power to produce or prevent - then we have 
indeed lost our grip upon the possibility of using moral judgments as 
a guide for action and evaluation.23 
Part of what makes it difficult to determine the implications of the skep-
tical theses for our ability to act morally and to make moral judgments 
about the actions of others is that skeptical theists might hold widely diver-
gent views about the nature of moral decision-making and evaluation, and 
the import of SIl-4, or of some subset of these, might be different depend-
ing on the details. We can, however, make a few general observations. 
(1) The truth of the skeptical theses would indeed, as Fales contends, 
preclude our knowing, at least on our own, the total intrinsic and instru-
mental value of states of affairs we might contemplate in our moral delib-
erations. That we would like to know the total value is no doubt true as 
well. That we need to know it in order that we be capable of acting as 
responsible moral agents is less obvious, which leads us to the next point. 
(2) Skeptical theism raises no barriers to agent evaluation, if this only 
requires us to determine whether it was the intention of the agent to do 
the right thing. Judgments about praiseworthiness and blameworthiness 
can still be made even if, for all we know, an apparently evil action has 
unknown good consequences, and vice-versa. Of course this is not 
enough fully to escape the charge that skeptical theists will be morally 
crippled by their skepticism: it remains to be shown that we can confi-
dently make moral choices, and this involves the evaluation of alterna-
tive courses of action. 
(3) When it comes to evaluating actions we might just interest ourselves 
in what seems right and wrong relative merely to our (possibly) limited 
information, but then we must concede that, for all we can tell, our moral 
judgments might be wildly off the mark. Alternatively, we can prevail 
upon God simply to tell us what is right, and follow his commands regard-
less of whether we are able to comprehend the moral reasoning behind 
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them. Fales attributes a version of the latter view to Marilyn McCord 
Adams: it is only for us to follow the rules God hands down to us. What 
chiefly (though not solely24) worries Fales is the degradation of our status 
as moral agents the view seems to involve. 
God's commands could take the form of strictly prescribing or enjoin-
ing certain actions, regardless of the consequences foreseeable by us. 
But if they were of this form, our moral freedom (beyond decisions as 
to how to apply the Law in particular circumstances) would consist 
of nothing more than the ability to choose whether to obey or not. 
Deliberation with a view to the consequences of action would be 
morally irrelevant. But such a limited form of moral responsibility as 
this would hardly suit the "station" of an intelligent dog, let alone 
agents such as ourselves.25 
It is less easy here than in previous cases to determine whether skeptical 
theism has the bad consequences imputed to it: what is degrading is, after 
all, largely a matter of personal taste. I leave it to the reader to consider 
whether the present view puts us in an abject condition qua moral agents. 
If it does, and if it is any part of theism to attribute to human moral agents 
the sort of responsibility for their actions that requires of them more than 
what we can do on Adams's view, then the skeptical theist confronts a 
problem of internal inconsistency at worst; at least, he must accept that his 
condition as a moral agent is low. If it is believed that skeptical theism does 
not have this consequence, then Adams's view represents for skeptical the-
ists at least one way in which to obviate the present version of PB. 
Other moral theories mayor may not be ones to which skeptical theists 
can subscribe consistent with their skeptical commitments; they have to be 
considered case by case. And there might be other ways in which to argue 
that skeptical theists are committed to some form of moral skepticism. 
Brice Wachterhauser, for example, claims that certain of the world's more 
heinous evils are test-cases in the sense that any point of view that does not 
recognize them as gratuitous cannot plausibly be considered a moral point 
of view at all. After describing some of these evils, Wachterhauser says: 
These are "limit cases" for moral theory such that any moral theory 
can be tested by its ability to give a convincing account of why such 
evils are morally unjustifiable. Any moral theory which cannot give 
such an account can quite plausibly be dismissed and any theory 
which claims that such evils are only apparently unjustifiable strains 
our moral credulity beyond its possible limits. If we can know any-
thing at all about the nature of unjustifiable evil it must be based 
upon such cases or the very project of moral understanding must be 
hopeless from the start. .... [W]e cannot appeal to the difference 
between divine and human knowledge in order to understand God's 
response (or lack thereof) because there are no principles that could 
possibly justify the existence of such an evil.26 
This is not uniquely a problem for skeptical theists: it is supposed to 
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be a problem for any theist who believes that no actual evil is gratu-
itous. But skeptical theists doubtless will find Wachterhauser's remarks 
in the quoted passage - especially the last statement - merely question-
begging. 
v. 
What Rowe finds especially objectionable about skeptical theism is that 
it appears to have the consequence that no amount of evil in the world can 
constitute even prima facie evidence of God's non-existence. 
For, to repeat their constant refrain, since we don't know that the 
goods we know of are representative of the goods there are, we can-
not know that it is even likely that there are no goods that justify God 
in permitting whatever amount of apparently pointless, horrific evil 
there might occur in our world. Indeed, if human life were nothing 
more than a series of agonizing moments from birth to death, their position 
would still require them to say that we cannot reasonably infer that it 
is even likely that God does not exist. But surely such a view is 
unreasonable, if not absurd.27 
It follows that we have a good reason to reject the skeptical theses that 
entail this absurd consequence. 
Note, incidentally, that what Rowe says does not entail that skeptical 
theists could not rationally believe that the evils in the envisioned world 
are gratuitous - only that this could not be inferred - consistent with STl-
4 - from their inability to imagine any MSR for God's actualizing such a 
world. Possibly there are non-inferential grounds on which to believe in 
the gratuitousness of these evils. The issue then comes down to 
whether, according to one's broader epistemology, it is rational to 
believe in this way in the gratuitousness of the evils, while also uphold-
ing the skeptical theses. At the least, this view would require rejecting 
principle D, above. And it might open the door to a different form of the 
evidential argument from evil: one that does not require the atheologian 
to reject any of STl-4.28 
Suppose that the skeptical theses do have the implication Rowe men-
tions: that no amount or variety of evil whatsoever could constitute (for us) 
evidence of God's non-existence. Then skeptical theists must choose 
between biting the bullet and accepting the consequence despite its (at 
least) superficial implausibility, or they must attenuate somewhat their 
skepticism and claim that some evils are bad enough that if there were a 
good reason for God's permitting them, probably we would know about it. 
They then would have to claim that none of the evils we find in this world 
are this bad. The obvious drawback is that, now, Rowean arguments from 
evil are no longer out of order. 
Of course, if there is independent and overwhelmingly good reason to 
believe that the skeptical theses, or anyone of them (anyone by itself 
appears sufficient to block Rowean inferences, though for convenience I 
have focused mainly on STl), are true, then we simply are forced to accept 
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even their less palatable implications. My aim here has been to show that 
these implications are less grave than some have claimed. 
Northern Illinois University 
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